Update 2000:  Progress and Limitations In Developing a Water Market in California by Yolles, Peter L
 74 
 
UPDATE 2000:  PROGRESS AND LIMITATIONS 
IN DEVELOPING A WATER MARKET IN CALIFORNIA 
 
Peter L. Yolles 
Western Water Company 
Point Richmond, CA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Water markets have long been proposed for California 
as a water management tool to increase water use 
efficiency.  Variability of precipitation across time and 
space, a fast growing population with strong 
environmental concerns, a vocal agricultural sector, and 
a powerful service economy combine to create pressure 
on limited indigenous water supplies.  While continued 
investments in conservation are needed to continue to 
reduce demand-side pressure, California water 
policymakers are seeking innovative market-based 
solutions to cooperatively and efficiently allocate water.  
So far, California has failed to create the key elements 
that would support a dynamic water market.  This paper 
will review efforts to initiate a water market in 
California, provide an update on the state-of-the market, 
and suggest some solutions. 
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The theme of this special issue of Water Resources 
Update focuses on trans-boundary water issues.  
Although most California water does not cross national 
boundaries from source to use, agriculture-to-urban 
water transfers do traverse political, social, and 
economic borders.1  The progress made in developing a 
water market in California may inform efforts in other 
basins where similar efforts are ongoing.   
 
CALIFORNIA’S WATER SUPPLY 
 
California’s water supplies are distributed unevenly, 
both geographically and temporally.  Of the 71 million 
acre-feet (maf) of average annual runoff, more than 70 
percent occurs in the northern half of the state while 
about 75 percent of water demand is in the southern half 
of the State (DWR p. 3-2).2 Seventy-five percent of the 
State’s average annual precipitation occurs between 
November and March (DWR p. 3-5).  In addition to 
seasonal variability, California is prone to multi-year 
droughts, the most recent of which lasted six years from 
1987 until 1992 (DWR p. 3-6).  Making matters worse, 
California’s population is expected to grow quickly 
from a projected 35 million people in year 2000 to 45 
million in 2020, an annual increase of 1.4 percent (CA 
Dept of Finance website).  To meet these demands in 
drought years and otherwise, a market mechanism 
reallocating only a small percentage of available water 
would increase system flexibility, reliability, and 
ecosystem protection. 
 
Instead of encouraging a dynamic market mentality, 
California has continued to rely on hardware fixes to 
address the combined pressures of seasonal and annual 
variability with population growth.  The result has been 
massive efforts to control water supplies to the extent 
possible through storage and conveyance.  The State 
Water Project, the federal Central Valley Project, and 
numerous regional and local projects have been 
constructed to store water when it is available and to 
transfer water to where it is needed.  By 1980, almost 
every viable dam site had been used.   
 
Now, without a vigorous water market, California has 
arrived at a point at which, even with extensive 
infrastructure, each of three major water use sectors in 
California (agriculture, urban, environment) faces future 
water shortages as pressures rise from population 
increases, economic growth and implementation of 
environmental regulations.  If a drought were to occur in 
the year 2000, California would likely see the following 
effects:  Water supply for all uses would decline from 
78 maf to 60 maf; urban areas in the San Francisco Bay 
Area and the south coast region, including Los Angeles 
and San Diego counties, would be vulnerable to 50 
percent reductions in supply; agricultural users in the 
San Joaquin Valley could face reductions up to 75 
percent of their surface water supply; and aquatic 
species and riparian habitat would be severely impacted 
(DWR p. 3-23; Gleick et. al. 1995).3  While users with a 
groundwater supply would have a cushion, no sector 
would be left unaffected, repeating the California 
experience in the 1987-92 drought.  Had California 
supported a market mechanism for reallocating a 
fraction of available water between willing buyers and 
willing sellers, there would now be in place a system to 
help address the needs for additional flexibility, 
reliability, and ecosystem protection. 
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Since the construction of the state’s water conveyance 
facilities, the ability for third parties to transfer water 
has been constrained by the internally conflicting roles 
of the public agencies.  The California Department of 
Water Resources (DWR), the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation (USBR), and the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California (MWD), are 
simultaneously the operators and the regulators of their 
respective facilities, the State Water Project, the Central 
Valley Project, and Colorado River Aqueduct.  The 
result is that the agencies allocate capacity in their 
pumps and aqueducts in their own interest in order to 
retain power for themselves and their contract 
constituents through continued control of the facilities 
(Easter, et. al. 1998).  Additionally, state laws that 
mandate open access to conveyance facilities for fair 
compensation have not been supported or clarified by 
the legislature or the courts.    
 
Water transfers are not new to California.  In fact, 
transfers within water districts and within project 
service areas are commonplace.  Individual farmers 
have completed over 1,200 transactions within the 
Central Valley Project service area (Littleton et. al. 
1995).  Agricultural districts buy and sell water to each 
other on a spot market, usually within the same basin. 
Contractors of the State Water Project have executed  a 
handful of transfers, most between agricultural users 
(Littleton et. al. 1995).  This evidence illustrates that 
transfers do occur, but usually only within the 
agricultural sector and rarely the long distances between 
different hydrologic basins, which would require the use 
of project facilities such as those controlled by DWR, 
USBR, and MWD. 
 
 
Market Obstacles:  Third Party Impacts and Transaction 
Costs 
 
Obstacles to water transfers usually have taken one of 
two forms:  over-sensitivity to third party impacts and 
high transaction costs.  Third-party impacts are so 
named for the potential impacts on those parties other 
than either the buyer or the seller of water.  Of most 
concern is the reduction in economic or environmental 
benefits to the area-of-origin, from which the water is 
being transferred.  An acre-foot of water transferred 
elsewhere, it is argued, will mean one less acre-foot of 
water used to grow local crops locally.  Hence, the 
demand for services to manage crops will be reduced.  
Fewer seeds and less fuel for tractors may be purchased 
and less farm labor will be required.  Less water applied 
may also translate into less return flow to other farmers 
downstream and possibly less water for species 
dependent on farm habitat.  To date, these arguments 
have been compelling to decisionmakers and have 
resulted in the demise of several proposed transfers.   
 
However, transfers are specific to a particular situation 
and can be designed to avoid or mitigate most impacts.  
For example, transfers of conserved agricultural water 
manage to avoid third party impacts by selling only 
water that is made available by increases in efficiency.  
Shifting to crops that evapotranspirate less, for example, 
reduces consumptive use while maintaining the total 
number of acres in production.  Such a transaction may 
even produce additional environmental benefits by 
increasing flow in rivers below the original point of 
diversion and secondary economic and community 
benefits if the substitute crop is of higher value.  While 
each water transfer deal is different and should be 
evaluated on its own merits, proposed transfers of 
conserved water indicate that market participants have 
incorporated some third-party impact concerns and have 
worked to reduce or minimize those negative impacts. 
 
While some obstacles have been overcome, high 
transaction costs continue to be a major reason for 
unsuccessful inter-sectoral deals.  Archibald and 
Renwick (1998) group transaction costs into two types:  
administratively-induced costs (AICs), which include 
marketing-related expenses such as developing 
customers and negotiating contracts; and policy-induced 
costs (PICs), which include regulatory, permitting, and 
compliance costs.  They applied this framework to the 
California marketplace to analyze potential gains-from-
trade from hypothetical water transfers.  Their results 
indicate that PICs are preventing inter-district transfers 
from occurring and suggest “policies influencing PICs 
need to be examined to clarify and perhaps to reduce 
these costs if market performance is to be improved.”  
Archibald and Renwick’s results mirror the practical 
experience of many private water companies in their 
efforts to facilitate inter-sectoral transactions.  PICs 
associated with some transfers can be more than the 
value of the entire transaction, making them 
economically impracticable. 
 
 
California Drought Water Bank:  Fleeting Success 
 
An example of the regulators’ power is that the only 
period in which inter-sectoral and inter-basin transfers 
were successful was when the government orchestrated 
the California State Emergency Water Bank of 1991.  In 
a short period, the government-run Water Bank program 
developed 800,000 AF of supply from 351 contracts 
with agricultural users, with the DWR negotiating with 
farmers as a group (Coppock 1994).  Water was 
purchased at a flat rate of $125 per acre-foot, to prevent 
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sellers from earning excessive profits, and sold to urban 
and agricultural users at $175 per acre-foot.4  Water in 
excess of demand was stored.  The Water Bank was 
extended another year, but demand dwindled as winter 
rains returned and was closed thereafter.   
 
The Water Bank succeeded in assisting the opening of a 
market.  In 1991, the fifth consecutive year of drought, 
stakeholders dropped many common objections to 
large-scale trading, such as objections to fallowing (as a 
way of obtaining water for transfer), and cleared the 
way for the reduction in transaction costs and 
streamlining the regulatory process.  To do this, the 
Legislature promulgated emergency legislation:  
Assembly Bill 9X provided water suppliers the ability to 
transfer water outside the supplier’s service area and 
Assembly Bill 10X ensured no risk to the supplier’s 
water right during the drought (Littleton et. al. 1995).  
The Bank showed that under conditions of drought, 
political and economic obstructions to large-scale 
markets diminish enough to allow agreement.   
 
 
Closure of the Water Bank:  A Market For Emergencies 
Only 
 
The Water Bank closed in 1992 for several reasons:  
demand dwindled as precipitation increased and studies 
found evidence of economic impacts to areas-of-origin 
from the practices of fallowing land (Howitt 1994).  The 
Bank’s demise illustrated that, under the current 
regulatory and institutional dynamic, a dynamic 
marketplace cannot be sustained.  Since 1992, DWR, 
the same agency that was able to develop and transfer 
800,000 AF under its own program during the drought, 
has been unwilling to provide similar access to facilities 
at economic rates to third parties.  The transaction costs 
associated with meeting high access prices and 
overcoming these regulatory hurdles have effectively 
prevented third parties from completing long-distance 
transfers.  
 
Despite some optimistic studies, no formal market for 
water actually exists in California.  Easter, Dinar and 
Rosegrant (1998) argue that, despite high transaction 
costs, a formal market has developed in California 
during the 1990s because of (1) excessive economic and 
environmental costs of developing new sources of 
supply; and (2) potentially significant gains-from-trade 
of transferring existing water supplies (Vaux and Howitt 
1984).5  To be sure, California has experienced a growth 
in market transactions within agricultural districts and 
within sectors. However, completed inter-regional and 
inter-sectoral transfers outside of the State Water Bank, 
remain elusive with broken deals littering the landscape.  
Numerous  single  seller – single  buyer  agricultural-to- 
urban transactions have been negotiated and signed, but 
water never actually moved.  Three of these transactions 
include those between (1) Imperial Irrigation District 
and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California; 
(2) Palo Verde Irrigation District and MWD; and (3) 
Devil’s Den Water District and Castaic Lake Water 
Agency (Haddad 2000).  These and other uncompleted 
agricultural-to-urban transfers form a long historical 
chain of unconsummated deals in the California market.  
The pressing question is:  why, in an environment so 
needy for innovative measures of water policy, have 
water transfers not succeeded? 
 
CURRENT STATE OF THE MARKET 
 
In expectation of a free market created by increased 
demand, significant regulatory and institutional reform, 
and lower transaction costs, for-profit companies and 
environmental organizations have increased their 
market activity.  Each new entrant adds liquidity in a 
market that has long been dominated by powerful public 
agencies and monopolistic quasi-public wholesalers.  
New entrants promote reform by encouraging retail 
users to demand supplier choice and by signaling to 
government that large constituencies are depending on a 
water market to meet their growing needs. 
 
For-Profit Companies 
 
For-profit entrants into this marketplace include 
Western Water Company (Western), Vidler Water 
Company (Vidler), Azurix, and Cadiz Land Company 
(Cadiz).   The strategy of each of these companies is, in 
part, to generate profits from water transfer transactions.  
Most importantly, these firms act as catalysts for reform 
by sponsoring new legislation and assisting government 
agencies in streamlining the transfer process. 
 
Each firm is implementing its strategy in a slightly 
different way and across the demand and supply chain.  
Unlike other firms that have invested heavily in storage 
facilities, Western focuses on water transfer 
transactions.  In the absence of legal consistency and 
clarity, Western engages in transactions that generate 
profits and reduce policy-induced transaction costs.  
Western completed the first ever privately facilitated 
agriculture-to-urban water transfer utilizing publicly 
owned conveyance facilities in December 1998 by 
wheeling 1,000 acre-feet from a San Joaquin Valley 
source to the Santa Margarita Water District in Orange 
County.  The transfer utilized the State Water Project 
and MWD’s conveyance and treatment facilities, paying 
full cost, which caused Western to incur a financial loss.  
However, the transaction illustrated that profitable 
transfers of this kind are possible if only third parties 
 77 
were provided access to fairly priced wheeling capacity 
in public conveyance facilities.   
 
Western has also helped irrigation districts to make 
conservation water available for transfer.  To encourage 
farmers and agricultural districts to invest in water 
conservation methods, the California Water Code 
allows water users to retain the rights to the conserved 
water and to transfer that water to other users (CA 
Water Code).  As a result, the transferred water is 
defined as beneficially used, thereby increasing the 
dominion of the water right and allowing a return on the 
water conservation investment.  Western’s first success 
was the water transfer petition filed jointly with partner 
Natomas Central Mutual Water Company, which was 
approved by the State Water Resources Control Board 
in Order 99-012, issued on December 28, 1999.  This 
decision and Western’s more recent transfer approvals, 
Orders 00-08 and 00-09 of July 10, 2000, have helped 
clarify the transfer rules surrounding conserved water 
(CA Water Code; State WRCB; Western Wat. 2000).6  
With each such successive transaction, Western has 
achieved greater clarity of water policy and regulations.  
It is unfortunate and sub-optimal that regulatory clarity 
can only be gained submitting real transactions through 
the regulatory process.    
   
While Western is striving to create a market for 
transfers in every type of hydrologic year, other 
companies have placed bets on wheeling water only in 
dry years, when water demand and prices are higher.  
To do so, Vidler, Cadiz and Azurix have all invested in 
groundwater storage projects in order to store water in 
wet years and deliver water in dry years.  Vidler has 
developed a conjunctive use groundwater storage 
project in Arizona utilizing a plan to store Central 
Arizona Project water in normal and wet years, and to 
sell exchange water in dry years to urban southern 
California through the Colorado River Aqueduct 
(Schlehuber 1999).  Vidler has also purchased space in 
the Semitropic Groundwater Storage Project in 
California’s San Joaquin Valley, which it hopes to lease 
to municipal water districts.   
 
Cadiz Land Company also has extensive underground 
storage capacity in San Bernadino County and signed a 
50-year agreement to allow MWD to store surplus flows 
from its Colorado River rights.  In dry years, stored 
water would be pumped into the Colorado River 
Aqueduct, along with some of the Company’s 
indigenous water supplies for delivery into MWD’s 
service area (Cadiz Land Co).   
 
Azurix, a publicly traded subsidiary of the international 
energy company Enron, acquired in October 1999 the 
Madera Ranch groundwater project in San Joaquin 
Valley (“Madera . . . Bank”).  Azurix intends to bank 
surplus flows exported from the Bay-Delta and other 
sources in the groundwater basin and sell pumped or 
exchange water in dry years to southern California. 
 
Both the Cadiz and the Azurix groundwater project are 
currently undergoing permitting processes, which 
prevents the estimation of a completion date. 
 
 
Water on the Web 
 
In what is becoming a competitive space online, a 
number of websites catering to the trading of water 
rights have emerged.  So far, the number of buyers and 
sellers is small, but the potential exists for the Internet 
to lower administratively-induced transaction costs by 
improving the exchange of information, such as price 
discovery through competitive bidding.  Azurix has 
invested heavily in an online exchange called 
Water2Water.com.  Azurix announced the creation of 
the website in December 1999, and launched it in March 
2000.  Azurix may have underestimated the complexity 
of executing water trades online, and as of June 2000, 
no water trades have been completed.  Azurix is 
revamping its website, which will be devoted to 
individual watersheds.  A pilot is currently being 
developed for a watershed in the state of Texas (White 
2000).  
 
However, Azurix’s experience has not deterred others 
from developing more of these so-called business-to-
business marketplaces.  New entrants seeking to 
establish an online water exchange include 
WaterRightsMarket.com of Littleton, CO; 
WaterBank.com of Albuquerque N.M., and 
WaterInvestments.com from Group Triton of San 
Diego, CA.   
 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
 
Environmental organizations are entering the market 
largely as potential lessees of temporary water rights or 
purchasers of permanent water rights to protect and 
restore riparian habitat and instream fisheries.  In 
particular, environmental NGOs are motivated to 
explore the as-yet unused California Water Code 
Section 1707, which allows riparian water rights to be 
transferred off the land only for instream environmental 
or recreational uses.  Environmental Defense and the 
Trust for Public Land are in the market to secure water 
flows specifically to augment supplies for critical 
ecosystems (Suyeyasu 2000).  The Rivers Program of 
the Trust for Public Land is also evaluating purchases of 
additional water flows for fishery restoration and overall 
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ecosystem health and protection (Holland 2000).  These 
entrants are too recent to evaluate their potential impact 
on a water market, but these ventures from non-profit 
organizations are an encouraging sign of an emerging 
market.  Their participation is also a validation for 
environmentalists who have long argued in favor of 
markets as an alternative mechanism to government 
intervention for the return of much needed flows into 
the Bay-Delta ecosystem.   
 
 
Governmental Agencies 
 
Several agencies are participating in the California 
market in various roles.  A recently developed new 
approach has been taken by CALFED’s Environmental 
Water Account (EWA), which is designed to purchase 
water on the market just as any other third party would.  
Through extensive computer simulations, EWA can 
predict what water quality and fish flows can be 
improved significantly with small purchases and 
releases during critical periods.  CALFED intends to 
implement a small-scale version of the EWA during 
2000. 
 
CALFED also is implementing a Water Transfer 
Program with a mission to reduce policy-induced 
transaction costs, increase conveyance capacity 
availability, and improve information sharing Young 
2000).  “On-Tap”, will be a web-based information 
clearinghouse designed to improve information sharing 
and will provide a range of valuable services including a 
guide to assist parties through the permitting process 
and a database of historical and pending water transfers 
(CALFED).  The database will be particularly useful to 
third parties who otherwise would not have access to 
up-to-date information about proposed transactions that 
may impact their livelihoods.  DWR, USBR and State 
Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) will manage 
the clearinghouse collectively.  The clearinghouse is a 
start, but agencies need to continue to drastically reduce 
PICs in new ways. 
 
Unfortunately, some agencies have chosen other roles 
that may hurt rather than help the market.  For example, 
the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) is 
allocating $10 million during 2000 to purchase water to 
supplement water deliveries to agricultural contractors 
of the Central Valley Project who are receiving less than 
their maximum annual allotments.  While Central 
Valley farmers are not undeserving of efforts by USBR 
to fulfill their contractual obligations, the $10 million 
allocation acts as a government subsidy to contractors 
and distorts the water market for all other participants.  
If government agencies are looking to market 
mechanisms to make California’s water system more 
efficient, they should abide by the same ground rules as 
all other market players and not skew the system for the 
benefit of particular water market participants. 
 
In its effort to acquire additional rights to water in dry 
years, MWD released a request for proposals in January 
2000.  In May 2000, 16 offers were received from 
prospective sellers that included water agencies and 
landowners.  The offers ranged widely in geography, 
price as well as in the way water would be made 
available.  However, by acting as a single buyer, the 
agency is stifling the creation of a dynamic market.  
MWD is instead using its power over Southern 
California’s distribution system to control the water 
market, in effect becoming the only practical buyer of 
water.  The market would be better off if MWD and 
other agencies chose a role either as a system operator 
or as regulator, but not both. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 
 
In the last two years, there has been a convergence of 
opinion that a water market is an important tool for 
managing water supply in the future.  Governmental 
agencies, non-governmental environmental 
organizations, and for-profit corporations are all in 
support of pursuing transfers as a tool.  State and federal 
agencies publicly support water transfers and, in the 
cases of DWR and USBR, are required to facilitate 
transfers.  CALFED, the joint state & federal 
consortium of agencies working towards a solution for 
the Bay-Delta, has promoted water transfers as a key 
tool integral to its water supply, water quality and 
ecosystem restoration components.   
 
Advocates of water marketing in California hope that 
continued interest in markets and the increasing need for 
efficient water allocations will result in necessary 
improvements in market performance.  An excellent 
start would be the adoption of the specific reforms 
recommended in the recently published California 
Legislative Analyst’s Office report on water transfers 
(Hill 1999).  The recommendations, focusing on 
clarifying laws and procedures, echo Archibald and 
Renwick’s analysis advocating a reduction in policy-
induced transaction costs to increase market 
performance.  Most important are the lack of a clear, 
consistent statutory policy and to make available 
capacity in publicly owned conveyance facilities for a 
fair price.  Without clarity, parties must an inordinate 
amount of time and money to achieve regulatory 
approvals.  Without fairly priced and available capacity, 
long-distance transfers will remain economically 
infeasible. 
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Figure 1:  Analysis of California Water Transfer Market by Legislative Analyst’s Office (Hill 1999) 
 
Problems Recommendations 
Lack of Clear, Consistent Statutory Policy Consolidate Water Transfer Law Into Single Act 
Lack of Information About Transfers and Their 
Impacts 
Establish Water Transfer Information Office 
Uncertain Water Rights Consolidate and Clarify Statutory Protection of Water 
Rights When a Transfer Takes Place 
Infrastructure Constraints Distribute Forecasts of Available Capacity in Public 
Conveyance Facilities; and Clarify Statutory Definition 
of “Fair Compensation” to Be Paid for Use of Public 
Conveyance Facilities 
Transaction Costs Could Be Lower Establish Water Transfer Information Office to 
Facilitate Transfers 
Inadequate Third-Party Protection Assess Water Transfer Fee to Fund Appropriate State 
Agency Review; Establish Statutory Criteria for 
Consistent and Comprehensive Protection; Utilize 
Water Transfer Information Office for Impact 
Evaluation and Information Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
Legislative And Legal Solutions 
 
Recent California water policy has not been without 
attempts at additional clarity in water transfer laws and 
regulations.  Recent developments include Senate Bill 
970, introduced by Senator Jim Costa (D-Fresno), 
which Governor Gray Davis signing into law.  This bill, 
“The Water Rights Protection and Expedited Short-
Term Water Transfer Act of 1999,” facilitates short-
term transfers by amending existing statutes.   The law 
grants rights to water purchasers in State Water 
Resource Control Board proceedings, and it qualifies 
water made available from temporary land fallowing as 
a conservation effort and protects water transferred as a 
beneficial use.  The combined effect will be support for 
a short-term spot market by providing farms the ability 
to sell into the market on an annual basis, thereby 
allowing the market to react more closely with 
hydrologic conditions.  At the same time, the law 
recognizes and minimizes third party impacts by 
limiting fallowing for transfers to one year. 
 
The Legislature should pass Senate Bill 506, which 
addresses the inordinately high cost of conveyance 
through publicly owned conveyance systems.7  SB 506 
is intended to amend the 1986 Katz Wheeling Statutes 
(California Water Code Section 1810-1814) so that third 
parties will be charged fair compensation for access to 
publicly owned conveyance facilities.  This amount 
would be an incremental, or marginal, fee based on the 
portion of the system that is used, plus some charge to 
cover a portion of the fixed cost.  However, facility 
owners have real concerns about transfers jeopardizing 
their financial integrity by displacing current sales.  But 
the increased use of excess capacity in existing pipelines 
at marginal prices would increase new sources of supply 
to a region in long-term shortage.  So far, MWD and 
others have successfully prevented SB 506 from 
passing. 
 
The Legislature is not only tackling conveyance costs 
directly with SB 506, but is also addressing the lack of 
oversight of MWD’s rate setting through Senate Bill 
1973.8  Under the Metropolitan Water District Act, the 
only body with current authority over MWD is the 
legislature itself.  SB 1973 would obligate the California 
Public Utilities Commission to oversee the rate setting 
of conveyance by MWD, and to determine the fairness 
of the rates.   
 
The California courts had an opportunity to reform the 
way system owners charge for conveyance through its 
consideration of MWD’s so-called “validation action.”  
In 1997, MWD sought to solidify its system-wide 
pricing for wheeling water to prevent new entrants into 
the southern California market.  In January 1998, in 
what became a fleeting victory for market proponents, 
the trial court decided against MWD calling the system-
wide charge unfair to competition and proposed a fee 
structure for wheeling based on incremental costs (CA . 
. . Reporter 1999).  This decision would have allowed 
third parties the ability to convey water through existing 
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pipelines at much less expensive rates and provide for 
additional competition and choice of suppliers to 
municipal water districts.  It would also have allowed 
the Katz wheeling statutes to be used in the manner they 
were intended.  Instead, MWD appealed this decision to 
the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, which overturned the lower court’s ruling.  The 
appellate court determined that the wheeling statutes do 
not prevent owners from including system-wide costs, 
and, moreover, that “the Legislature did not intend that 
the impact of the Wheeling Statutes should be to cause a 
water conveyance facility owner to lose money or to 
subsidize wheeling transfers” (Metropolitan . . . 
District).  The result is that the state’s judicial branch of 
government is unwilling to enforce the Katz wheeling 
statute, instead forcing the legislature to clarify and 
strengthen the Katz statutes as needed.9 
  
  
Colorado River Basin:  A Market in Hibernation  
 
At the federal government’s urging, California’s rights 
holders of Colorado River water signed an historic 
agreement in October 1999 (Key Terms . . . 1999).  The 
agreement represents a plan for these parties to reduce 
their diversion of water down to their Colorado River 
Compact allotment 4.4 maf per year, from current 
diversions of 5.3 maf.  This agreement has positive and 
negative aspects for the market.  MWD has won re-
operation of Colorado River reservoirs, and while this 
provides additional reliability to its customers, MWD 
will also be able to keep the Aqueduct full through the 
year 2015, resulting in very little availability of excess 
capacity to third parties.  This ensures that third parties 
will have no feasible way to transfer water to urban 
Southern California from any other water rights holder 
in the Colorado River basin for another 15 years.  On 
the other hand, the Agreement makes provisions for the 
1998 water transfer contract between the Imperial 
Irrigation District and San Diego County Water 
Authority.  The contract calls for the transfer up to 
200,000 acre-feet per year of conserved agricultural 
water to San Diego. The transaction, if consummated, 
would mark the largest single transfer of water from 
agriculture-to-urban use and would represent a large 
step forward in establishing a free market in California.    
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
While there continues to be hope that California’s water 
marketing will emerge  as an important tool for water 
management, the full public and private benefits are yet 
to be realized.  A continued effort must be made to 
reform the institutions overseeing water policy to allow 
new, more efficient methods of allocating scarce water 
supplies and conveyance capacity.  Indeed, policy-
induced transactions costs must be lower and 
government agencies must limit their role to either 
regulators or facility owners/operators.  Market reform 
can pay enormous future dividends for California by 
ensuring economic growth, restoring aquatic habitat, 
and protecting the state’s famed quality of life.  But 
without drastic change, entrepreneurial companies will 
disappear and cease to be an agent of change.  Without 
them, the opportunity for a water market will wane for 
the foreseeable future.  When others evaluate the 
potential to generate revenue in California from water 
transfers, they will undoubtedly look at the enormous 
amount of time and money expended by companies, and 
look for opportunities elsewhere.  Without significant 
reform now, California’s dream of efficient, market-
based water reallocation will remain a mirage.    
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ENDNOTE 
 
                                                 
1 California’s water supply is international to the extent 
that California has rights to 4.4 million acre-feet of the 
annual flow of the Colorado River, which eventually 
runs south into Mexico. 
 
2 One acre-foot is equal to 325,900 gallons or 1233.48 
cubic meters. 
 
3 N.B.:  Gleick et.al. (1995) argue that DWR’s 
projections are fundamentally flawed by projecting a 
water future for California that is increasingly unlikely 
because of probable advances in water efficiencies.  For 
example, Gleick estimates that total applied urban water 
use in 2020 would be 8.2 maf, 34% lower than DWR’s 
estimate of approximately 12.5 million acre-feet (DWR 
1994 estimate) 
 
4 See Haddad, and Easter et. al. who have analyzed why 
agriculture-to-urban transfers have not been successful. 
 
5 Vaux and Howitt some time ago already suggested, 
based on their 1984 scenario analysis utilizing marginal 
cost pricing, that potential economic benefits might total 
$3 billion by 2020, and that less than 100,000 acre-feet 
of new storage could be justified.   
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6 Water approved for transfer under the July 10, 2000 
Orders has been subsequently sold and delivered to 
Contra Costa Water District.  This transfer is the first 
privately facilitated agriculture-to-urban transfer to a 
Bay Area water district.   
 
7 Senate Bill 506 was introduced in the California 
Legislature by Senator Steve Peace (R-San Diego) in 
1999 and re-introduced in 2000. 
 
8 Senate Bill 1973 was introduced by Senator Don 
Perata (D-Oakland) in the 2000 session. 
 
9 The California Supreme Court denied petitions to 
review the MWD wheeling case on September 14, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
